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PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES ARISING OUT OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE OF CHARITABLE
OR GOVERNMENTAL BODIES
Thomas v. Prince George's County'
The plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought an action in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against the
Board of County Commissioners of Prince George's County
to recover for injuries resulting to the wife through the
alleged negligence of an anaesthetist employed at a hospital
operated by the County while the wife was a paying patient
at the institution. The lower Court sustained a demurrer
filed by the defendant on the ground that the County was
operating the hospital as a governmental function and
consequently was immune from tort liability.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the lower
Court in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiffs' declara-
tion because of the absence of an averment that the hospital
was being operated as a proprietory or corporate function
of the County rather than a governmental one. However,
when in the course of the argument it became apparent
that the defendant's hospital carried liability insurance, the
plaintiffs' request for a remand and new trial was granted
in order to test the effect of the Act of 1947, codified as
Article 48A, Section 82 of the Maryland Annotated Code
which provides:
"Each policy issued to cover the liability of any
charitable institution for negligence or any other tort
shall contain a provision to the effect that the insurer
shall be estopped from asserting, as a defense to any
claim covered by said policy, that such institution is
immune from liability on the ground that it is a charit-
able institution."
In remanding the case for a new trial, the court did not
indicate what the effect of the statute would be or in what
manner it should be correctly pleaded. However, assum-
ing that under this statute the collectable amount of insur-
ance carried by the charitable institution could be re-
covered,2 the following alternatives in pleading are sub-
mitted:
'200 Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952).
For a discussion of the substantive law on this point prior to this statute
see Note, Liability of Charitable Corporations and Trusts For Their Torts,
5 Md. L. Rev. 336 (1941). The scope of the present note will be restricted
to a discussion of the procedural side of the problem.
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(1) Proceeding against the insurer directly.
(2) Joining the insurer and charitable institution as
party defendants.
(3) Naming only the charitable institution as a party
defendant but averring in the declaration either
that the charitable institution is insured, or that it
is not immune from suit.
The privilege of proceeding directly against a liability
insurer has been generally denied an injured party follow-
ing the basic rule of contract law that, in absence of statute
or provision in the contract, only parties in privity are
allowed to sue thereon.' The standard liability insurance
contract is a personal one between the insurer and the in-
sured wherein the insurer's only liability arises after a final
judgment has been rendered against the insured.4 Further-
more, the argument of the injured party being a third party
beneficiary of the contract cannot be sustained unless it
appears that he, or the class of which he is a member, was
definitely and expressly recognized by the parties to the
contract at the time of its making as a "primary party in
interest".5
In Federal practice the cases have generally refused to
allow a joinder of the insured and the insurer under the
Joinder Rules of the Federal Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure.' The Federal Courts in applying these rules, which
if followed literally would seem to permit such joinder,
146 C. J. S. INSURANCE, Sec. 1191.
'4 RICHARDS, INSURANCE (5th ed., 1952) 2051, Ch. 13; Tullgren v. Jasper,
27 F. Supp. 413 (D. C. Md., 1939).
5Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 198 F. 721 (2nd Cir.,
1912). See also Note, The Effect of Insurance on the Tort Immunity of a
Governmental Subdivision, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1954), where the writer
advocates this method to prevent the insurer from pleading the insured's
immunity.
"Rule 18(b):
"Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another
claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined
in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only
in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties. . ....
Rule 20(a) :
"... All persons may be joined in one action as defendants If there
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,
occurences, or series of transactions or occurences and If any ques-
tion of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.
A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defend-
ing against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or
more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and
against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities."
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have avoided such a result by basing their decisions on a
substantive rule of evidence which excludes any injection
of the defendant's insurance into the trial and also on the
aforesaid fact that the insurer's liability is conditioned upon
a final judgment being procured against the insured.' In
granting a motion to dismiss by an insurer joined with an
insured in an action by the injured party, the Massachusetts
District Court, in the case of Jennings v. Beach, et al., said:
"I do not believe that rule 18(b) was ever intended
to cover a situation such as is presented here. As a
matter of fact, there is nothing in the pleadings to in-
dicate that the plaintiffs even have a claim against the
defendant insurance company at the present time....
While the question of the joinder of an insurance com-
pany as a party defendant is primarily procedural,
nevertheless, the ground for denial of such a right, in
part, is the possibility of prejudice through the knowl-
edge of the jury that a verdict will be paid by an insur-
ance company.""
These Courts justify their position by citing the enacting
clause of the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure which
provides that "said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor
modify the substantive rights of any litigant"Y
The question of Joinder of the liability insurer in Mary-
land would depend largely on how the Court of Appeals
would construe the Joinder Rules of the General Rules of
Practice and Procedure adopted in 1947 providing for suc-
7 Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (W. D. Mich., S. D., 1940) ; Headrick
v. Smoky Mountain Stages, 11 F. R. D. 205 (E. D. Tenn., N. D., 1950) ; Hertz
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 8 F. R. D. 431 (D. of Col., 1939) ; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE (2d. ed., 1948), Sec. 18.08; 2 BARRON AND HOLTZOF7, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE (Rules ed., 1950), See. 505, 533.
81 F. R. D. 442, 443 (D. Mass., 1940). See also Alleghany County, Pa.
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 32 F. Supp. 297, 301 (W. D. Pa., 1940), where the
Court in refusing to allow an indemnity company to be joined as a defen-
dant on a bond said:
"... the covenant as to payment, or the procuring of judgment before
the bringing of an action or proceeding against the Indemnity Com-
pany, vested a valuable substantive right in the Indemnity Com-
pany; . . . that to deprive the Indemnity Company of the covenant
which plaintiff made that it could not bring any action or proceeding
against the Indemnity Company until it had been paid the amount of
the Casualty Company's bond, or judgment had been procured against
the Casualty Company in said amount, would be equivalent to the
taking property without due process of law; that Rules 18(b) and
20(a) of the 'Rules of Civil Procedure' can be and should be construed
so as not to deprive the Indemnity Company of the aforesaid sub-
stantive right ......
Act of June 19, 1934, Ch. 651, 28 U. S. C. A. XI.
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cessive remedies against and multiple joinder of defen-
dants." Since these rules are similar to the Federal Joinder
Rules discussed previously, the Court might afford them
the same treatment given the Federal rules by the Federal
Courts which prohibited the joinder because of the intent
evidencing a desire to maintain the substantive rights of
the litigants, i.e., the defendant's right to have the fact that
he is insured kept from the jury, and the conditioning of
the insurer's liability upon a final judgment being levied
against the defendant.
In two lower court cases decided after the instant case,
one of which was the retrial of the principal case, joinder
of insurer and insured was held to be improper.1 It would
seem therefore that the general trend of decisions would
sustain the improbability of the Court of Appeals approving
of the first two alternative means of bringing a case within
the statute through the pleadings. That would leave the
remaining alternative of inserting an allegation of the
charitable institution's insurance coverage or of its non-
immunity from suit.
The availability of a procedure whereby the insurance
coverage would be mentioned would necessarily depend
however on the rule of evidence which demands exclusion
of any mention of insurance of the tortfeasor. This rule has
been applied to allegations in the pleadings as well as to
statements during the trial. 2 However, if under the facts
of the case, the subject of the insurance is a pertinent issue,
an exception to the rule has been raised permitting the in-
10 Part Two, Rule III 2(b)
"Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another
claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be
joined in a single action; but the court shall grant relief in 'that action
only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties."
Part Two, Rule III 2(d) :
"Separate claims involving different plaintiffs or defendants or both
may be joined in one action whenever any substantial question of law
or fact common to all the claims will arise in the action or for any other
reason the claims may conveniently be disposed of in the same pro-
ceeding. The claims joined may be joint, several, or in the alternative
as to plaintiffs or defendants or both. Any person may join in the
action as a plaintiff who demands any relief on any of the claims
joined and he need not be interested in the other claims or in obtaining
all the relief demanded. Any person may be joined as a defendant
against whom any relief is demanded on any claim, and he need not be
interested in defending against the other claims or all the relief
demanded."
Karr v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, Daily Record, May 1, 1953; Thomas v.
Board of County Commissioners of Prince George's County, Daily Record,
June 17, 1953. These lower Court decisions were not appealed.
12 Elliott v. Lester, 126 S. W. 2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939) ; 21 APPLEMAN
ON INSUBANcE (1947), Sec. 12831.
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jection of insurance at the trial. 3 Furthermore, where the
fact that a class of persons, such as common carriers, are
required to carry liability insurance, it has been held that,
since it was a matter of public knowledge, evidence of in-
surance could be admitted. 4 Wigmore has criticized this
rule of exclusion of evidence concerning insurance as in-
consistent. He points out the mention of insurance in good
faith is allowed on voir dire challenges of jurors and also
in questioning witnesses as to their interest or bias toward
the litigants where frequently the witness's relation to the
liability insurer allows the injection of insurance at the
trial.",
As to the effect of the injection of insurance at the trial
in Maryland, in the case of International Co. v. Clark, the
Court of Appeals stated:
".... this fact (insurance of the defendant) has noth-
ing whatever to do with the merits of the suit being
tried and is wholly irrelevant and immaterial to the
issue and could only have the effect of prejudicing the
jury in their verdict, either as to finding for the plaintiff
or the amount of damages which they might assess."' 6
However, the Court qualified this position in the later case
of Takoma Park Bank v. Abbott where they said: ". . . in
situations where the reference to insurance of the defen-
dant is practically unavoidable, a mistrial will not be de-
clared".1" The allegation of the charitable institution's in-
surance therefore might be allowed since it is a pertinent
fact, and since the Maryland Court of Appeals has con-
sistently granted charitable institutions an immunity from
liability for torts committed by its servants in carrying out
"8Hoover v. Turner, 42 Oh. App. 528, 182 N. E. 598 (1931) ; Goldstein
v. Johnson, 64 Ga. A. 31, 12 S. E. 2d 92 (1940) ; Paxson v. Davis, 65 F. 2d
492 (D. C. Cir., 1933) ; 21 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE (1947), Sec. 12834.
1" Croft v. Hall, 208 S. C. 187, 37 S. E. 2d 537 (1946).
"12 WOmoRE, EvIDENCE (3rd. ed., 1940), Sec. 282(a). See also, Green,
Blindfolding the Jury, 33 Texas L. Rev. 157 (1954).
'e147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647 (1925). Parenthetical material added. See
also Niles, Notes on Trial Practice, Negligence Cases, and Evidence, pub-
lished as part of the Veterans' Refresher Course, p. 63.
17 179 Md. 249, 264, 19 A. 2d 169 (1941). See also Cluster v. Upton, 165 Md.
566, 168 A. 882 (1933) ; Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, 172 Md. 388, 191 A. 717
(1937) ; Rhinehart v. Lemmon, 181 Md. 663, 29 A. 2d 279, 280 (1942), where
a Court in allowing a witness to testify to an insurance emblem on car
where the issue of whether the defendant's car was at the scene of the
accident was in question, said:
"A suggestion of the possession of insurance is not to be avoided
at the cost of suppressing evidence material to ithe establishment of
the cause of the accident and :the liability of the defendant sued for
damages."
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the work of the charity.'" On the nisi prius level, the in-
jection of insurance in the pleadings has been suggested
as a means by which possible plaintiffs might take ad-
vantage of the statute. 9 However in the recent lower court
case of Phillips v. Epworth Methodist Church, Inc.,"° such a
procedure was held to be demurrable. In order to avoid this
result the lower Court maintained that the better procedure
would be to allege that the defendant is not immune from
suit. This method would definitely avoid the violation of
the evidencial rule against the mention of insurance to the
jury. However in doing so the declaration might violate
the equally well settled rule of pleading that:
"Whatever facts are necessary to constitute the
ground of action, defense, or reply, as the case may be,
shall be stated in the pleading and nothing more; and
facts only shall be stated and not arguments, or infer-
ences, or matter of law or of evidence, or of which the
Court takes notice ex officio."'2
Since the reform in the pleading system of Maryland
took place in 1856, any ". . . plain statement of the (essen-
tial) facts ... without reference to mere form" is sufficient. 2
However this change did not relieve the pleader from his
common law duty of apprizing his adversary of the facts on
which he intends to rely. The Court of Appeals in case of
Pearce v. Watkins recognized this when they said:
"Although the Code, Art. 75, Sec. 3, says, 'any plain
statement of the facts necessary to constitute a ground
of action shall be sufficient', yet it says in the same
Article, Sec. 2, that 'whatever facts are necessary to
constitute a ground of action shall be stated'. This is
necessary that the defendant 'may be forewarned of
the nature of the proof to be preferred against him, and
be prepared to contradict, explain, or avoid it'."2"
Thus although the old requirement of formal allegations
was dispensed with, matters of law, of evidence, within
judicial notice, and conclusions of law still have no place in
"1 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885) ; Loeffler v. Sheppard-Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917).
Supra, n. 11.
Daily Record, Mar. 18, 1955.
Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 2. First italics supplied.
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 75, Sec. 3. Parenthetical material and italics
added.
-68 Md. 534, 538, 13 A. 376 (1888).
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the allegations of a declaration. 4 For this reason it would
seem that an allegation of the charitable institution's non-
liability without stating the facts which render it such
would be demurrable.
In the only case construing the statute25 the Court de-
cided "the plaintiff here has not brought himself within
the terms of the section quoted" where the declaration
made no mention of the insurer or of the charitable insti-
tution's non-liability. 6 This case would seem to indicate
the necessity of some form of allegation whereby the court
would be notified of the insurance of the charitable institu-
tion. Furthermore the Maryland court has recognized an
exception to the rule requiring the exclusion of insurance
at the trial where it was a pertinent issue and would not
have to reach far afield to apply the same reasoning to the
situation presented here. In the total absence of any direct
ruling on the instant problem, the statute must remain as a
monument to legislative shortsightedness, and an amend-
ment clearing up the procedural difficulty resulting from it
would apparently be welcomed by the practitioners of this
state.
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS AS A FRAUD ON
THE MARITAL RIGHTS OF THE
SURVIVING 'SPOUSE
Whittington v. Whittington'
Bessie E. Whittington and Luther E. Whittington were
married November 20, 1935, both parties having been previ-
ously married, and their respective children of the former
marriages were also married at this time. The parties lived
together happily on a farm for 16 years until the death of
Mr. Whittington on July 18, 1951. In May 1950, the de-
ceased, who owned another farm, wanted to sell it, but his
wife was unwilling to release her dower rights, contending
that they should maintain a reserve for old age as the de-
1 PoE, PLEADING & PRACTICE AT LAW (5th ed., 1925), Sec. 545 et seq.
Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110 (1873); Mills v. B. C. & A. Ry. Co., 111 Md. 260,
73 A. 885 (1909) ; Lapp v. Stanton, 116 Md. 197, 81 A. 675 (1911) ; Roth
v. Balto. Trust Co., 161 Md. 340, 158 A. 32 (1931) ; Brack v. Barton, 185
Md. 366, 45 A. 2d 100 (1945) ; Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Fuller Co., 111 Md.
321, 73 A. 738 (1909) ; Strauss v. Denny, 95 Md. 690, 53 A. 571 (1902);
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Shannon, 34 Md. 144 (1871).
"Md. Code (1951), Art. 48A, Sec. 82.
"Howard v. South Balto. General Hosp., 191 Md. 617, 620, 62 A. 2d
574 (1948).
'106 A. 2d 72 (Md., 1954).
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